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Abstract Inner speech is a pervasive feature of our conscious mental lives. Yet its 
function and character remain an issue of philosophical debate. The present paper 
focuses on the relation between inner speech and natural language and on the 
cognitive functions that various contributors have ascribed to inner speech. In 
particular, it is argued that inner speech does not consist of bare, context-free 
internal presentations of sentential (or subsentential) content, but rather has an 
ineliminable perspectival element. The proposed model of inner speech, which 
characterizes inner speech as akin to the testimony of an inner interlocutor, 
accounts for this perspectival element and, it is argued, is explanatorily superior, 
insofar as it better explains, amongst other phenomena, the often condensed 
character of inner speech. 
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1. Introduction 
The phenomenon of inner speech has long been described as "one 
of the most difficult to investigate"" yet its pervasiveness and 
introspective salience in conscious thought make it an interesting 
topic of philosophical analysis. Rather than focus on the relation 
between inner speech and the 'language of thought' as a putative 
'Vygotsky, 1986, 226. 
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medium of thought, the present paper focuses on its relation to 
natural language and on the functions that various contributors to the 
debate have ascribed to inner speech. In particular, I argue that inner 
speech does not consist of bare (context-free), internal presentations 
of sentential (or subsentential) content, but rather has an ineliminably 
perspectival element, much as in the external case of communication 
with an interlocutor. Inner speech, in a nutshell, may best be described 
as the testimony of an 'inner interlocutor'. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I 
characterize the phenomenon of inner speech and give a brief 
summary of the debate, including its historical origins. This is 
followed, in Section 3, by a discussion of the role of natural language 
in inner speech, which is often characterized as enabling second-order 
cognition - that is, the ability to attend to our own thoughts. The idea 
that inner speech and conscious thought are closely related can be 
generalized and extended, within a modular framework, by regarding 
intermodular integration as a key function of our language system; the 
theoretical implications of this are discussed in Section 4. Drawing on 
the preceding discussion, Section 5 provides a programmatic sketch of 
how the phenomenon of inner speech may be interpreted from within 
a modular framework and argues for the importance of context and 
perspective in inner speech. Rather than eliminating context, inner 
speech allows for a switching of perspectives, much like in the case of 
communication with external interlocutors. The paper ends with a 
brief Conclusion (Section 6), which summarizes the main points. 
2. The phenomenon of inner speech 
Inner speech is a pervasive feature of our conscious mental lives. 
Few people would dispute that we can introspectively ascertain that we 
often use words in thinking without making them audible (through 
speech) or visible (through reading and writing). Beyond this initial 
starting point, however, there is little agreement as to the character 
and function of inner speech.' 
, For a survey of the debate, see Vicente & Martinez-Manrique, 2011. 
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Lev Vygotsky (1896-1934), in his pioneering work on 
developmental psychology, considered inner speech to be the "internal 
reconstruction of an external operation"', which emerges fairly late in 
the child's cognitive development. In his , first 
published in Russian in 1934, Vygotsky notes the deep connection 
between concept acquisition, cognitive awareness, and language. Inner 
(self-directed) speech is a particular form of language use, which is 
derived from external - that is, other-directed - speech through a 
gradual process of internalization. Initially, speech is social and serves 
purely communicative functions as an external tool for social 
interaction. Over time, a child may employ speech in an egocentric 
way, by transferring socially acquired behavioural patterns to his or 
her "sphere of inner-personal psychic functions"'. Such self-directed 
talk, which in the beginning is voiced out aloud, is then further 
internalized and becomes (silent) inner speech. In addition, the 
process of internalization brings about syntactic changes. Thus, inner 
speech tends to be highly abbreviated and, according to Vygotsky, 
consists entirely of predicates: "It is as much a law of inner speech to 
omit subjects as it is a law of written speech to contain both subjects 
and predicates.'" Through a process of internalization, language as an 
external medium of communication and instruction is being 
transformed into a resource that the child can 'tap into', for example 
in problem-solving contexts. 
Instead of analyzing inner speech from a developmental angle, one 
may alternatively begin by considering the phenomenology of inner 
speech in adult cognizers. Doing so reveals that not all inner speech is 
of the 'abbreviated' sort, but rather that we also engage in more 
complex inner talk - especially in the run-up to (outward-directed) 
linguistic tasks, as when we inwardly rehearse what we will eventually 
say out loud. As Fernando Martinez-Manrique and Agustin Vicente 
have recently emphasized, any prospective theory of inner speech 
should do justice to the following two claims about its occurrence and 
overall character: 
3 Vygotsky, 1978, 57. 
'Vygotsky, 1986, 35. 
, Vygotsky, 1986, 243. 
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(i) We have phenomenological acquaintance with our inner voice 
even when we are not rehearsing linguistic actions, and in many cases 
we do not experience phonological representations of sentences but 
dispersed linguistic items. 
(ii) We can experience richer, more sentence-like inner speech, 
typically but not exclusively related to linguistic activities." 
There is no implication here that these two modes of inner speech 
are mutually exclusive (except perhaps at their most extreme), or that 
there can be no intermediate cases; clearly, the extent to which inner 
speech is 'rich' or 'abbreviated' is a matter of degree. Indeed, 
empirical studies of how inner speech is perceived and recalled 
suggest a multiplicity of functions and contexts, ranging from 
undirected ruminating or daydreaming to explicit, goal-directed uses 
in order "to plan tasks, remember self-motivate, solve problems, plan 
when to do specific tasks, [ ... ] rehearse upcoming conversations, read, 
write or calculate, study, control emotions, determine what to wear, 
self-censor, [and] replay past conversations".' 
While there is no hard and fast distinction between these two types 
of inner speech, given that they differ primarily in their 
phenomenological salience, which is a matter of degree, it is 
nonetheless useful to be aware of them as representing different ends 
of a spectrum. This way, one can explore possible transitions, for 
example from deliberate sentence-like inner speech (which, on 
occasion, may be derived from external speech, which is recalled in 
memory or for the purpose of self-regulation) to more dispersed and 
attenuated forms of inner speech. The ability to gradually internalize 
external representations, which fits with the phenomenology of more 
or less explicit (and more or less sentence-like) inner speech, also has 
repercussions for the 'internal/external' divide in relation to the 
extended mind thesis. David Rumelhart et al. (1986) raise this issue as 
follows: 
"We can be instructed to behave in a particular way. Responding 
to instructions in this way can be viewed simply as responding to 
, Martinez-Manrique & Vicente, 2010, 143. 
, Morin. Uttl. & Hamper, 2011, 1717. 
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some environmental event. We can also remember such an 
instruction and 'tell ourselves' what to do. We have, in this way, 
internalized the instruction. We believe that the process of 
following instructions is essentially the same whether we have 
told ourselves or have been told what to do. Thus even here we 
have a kind of internalization of an external representational 
format (i.e., language).'" 
Similarly, one may wonder whether inner speech is merely a way of 
tapping into an external resource - i.e. language - or whether it leads 
to any profound changes in the (prior) internal organization of the 
cognitive apparatus itself. Daniel Dennett argues for the latter view 
when he explicitly includes talking to ourselves among the ways in 
which "[w]e build elaborate systems of mnemonic associations" and, 
over time, "refine our resources by incessant rehearsal and tinkering, 
turning our brains [ ... ] into a huge structured network of 
competencies"; the principal "components of this technology for 
brain-manipulation are words".9 On Dennett's account, external 
speech - especially as received (and subsequently rehearsed) by 
children - is akin to the input involved in programming a massive 
parallel computer; over time such external input becomes internalized 
as "semi-understood self-commentary". Once again, the shift from 
more sentence-like linguistic representations to more attenuated and 
dispersed forms of inner speech is thus being invoked in the service of 
a specific theoretical proposal about the workings of the mind. 
Contrasting his own views with those of Dennett, Andy Clark argues 
for a less 'transformational' role of linguistic representations: "Where 
Dennett sees public language as effecting a profound but subtle re-
organization of the brain itself, I am inclined to see it as in essence an 
external resource which complements - but does not profoundly alter 
- the brain's own basic modes of representation and computation."" 
Finally, there is the question (to be taken up in the next section) of 
whether the phenomenon of inner speech gives us any indication as to 
whether we 'think in words' - and, if so, whether we should accord 
'Rumelhart et aI., 1986,47. 
, Dennett, 1998, 292. 
w Clark, 2011, 25; Clark's paper was first published in 1998. 
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visual imagination"", all of which are properly construed as thought 
processes. Some thought processes are unconscious - as we may 
realize on those occasions where, having abandoned a complicated 
problem, the solution suddenly occurs to us, having been worked out 
'in the back of our mind'. There are, of course, also processes we are 
conscious of - e.g. bodily sensations, emotions, moods -, which do 
not qualify as thoughts. Yet, where the two domains - propositional 
thought and consciousness - overlap, thoughts are necessarily 
expressed in language, or so Bermudez argues: 
"When we are conscious of propositional thoughts we are 
conscious of imagined sentences. What we introspect when we 
introspect our propositional thoughts in the manner required for 
the processes of second-order cognitive dynamics is inner 
speech."20 
Contrasting the case of "public language sentences" (ibid.) with 
other purported vehicles of thought, notably mental models and 
mental maps, Bermudez argues that "[b]y a process of elimination [ .. ] 
we have reached the conclusion that thoughts can only be the objects 
of the type of reflexive thinking in which thoughts are the objects of 
thought if they have natural language vehicles".21 Since such reflexive 
thinking does occur, the natural-language character of thought has 
thereby been established, or so the argument goes. This conclusion, 
however, is a little hasty, given that there is ample empirical evidence 
(including the phenomenon of 'verbal overshadowing', to be discussed 
in the next section) that not only are natural-language vehicles not 
necessary for successful reasoning, but they can even impede 
performance on certain cognitive tasks. This is not to deny that 
verbalization can have a positive effect on other tasks, for example by 
focusing attention, improving executive control, or aiding the retrieval 
'" Bermudez, 2003, 160. 
'0 Bermudez, 2003, 160. 
" Bermudez, 2003, 163, italics added; for the detailed comparison of public 
language sentences with mental models and mental maps, see Bermudez, 
2003, 160-163. 
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of task goals"; rather, it cautions against the wholesale assertion that 
all propositional thoughts "that we can consciously introspect [ ... J take 
the form of sentences in a public language".23 
4. The modularity thesis 
Another account that attaches great, though not exclusive, 
significance to the natural-language character of conscious thought is 
Peter Carruthers's massive modularity thesis, which holds that the 
human mind consists entirely, or mainly, of mental modules, each of 
which is adapted to a relatively narrow, domain-specific class of 
cognitive tasks. (See Carruthers, 2006.) One challenge which a theory 
of mental modularity must meet is to account for certain important 
and distinctive features of human cognition, of which Carruthers 
identifies three main categories: "flexibility of content; creativity of 
content; and abductive inferences performed upon such contents."24 
Previously, Carruthers (1996) had argued for the central role of 
natural language as a vehicle of thought, as opposed to thought 
processes being carried out in a separate 'language of thought'. Given 
that we introspectively encounter our occurrent thought processes in 
(linguistically codified) inner speech, the law of parsimony demands 
that we should also consider our latent and unconscious thoughts as 
being codified using natural-language resources, or so the argument 
went. Carruthers subsequently relaxed this demand, insofar as he 
shifted his attention from questions concerning the nature of the 
vehicles of conscious thought to the function of language as tool for 
thinking. One of the challenges that emerges from the purported 
massive modularity of the mind is how to account for the remarkable 
degree of integration across different modules. If the mind indeed 
consists of an assemblage of distinct modules, each of which is 
adapted to the demands of a highly specific demands and largely 
independent of other modules, the question arises what can hold such 
" See for example Miyake et aI., 2004. 
23 Bermudez, 2003, 159-160. 
24 Carruthers, 2003, 503. 
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an assemblage together and enable the integration of information 
coming from the various modules. Language is a prime candidate for 
the task of achieving intermodular integration, given that it is already 
in the business of integrating information - outside information, that 
is - and making it accessible to other modules for cognitive 
processing. Even without delving into the details of how the language 
system works, we can see that its dual character as an input and 
output system imbues it with precisely the features that are required 
for achieving integration and information exchange across different 
modules. Carruthers goes even further by suggesting that the 
language system can globally 'broadcast' linguistically represented 
information to the other modules, thereby placing it at the centre of 
the human mind's cognitive activity. 
In his most recent work, Carruthers (2011, 2015) develops his 
theory of the mind further by arguing that all conscious thought is 
sensory-based (i.e., involves visual-imagistic, proprioceptive, or 
auditory imagery, including inner speech), while any "amodal" (i.e., 
non-sensory) propositional attitudes must necessarily be unconscious. 
While the latter can be causally operative, only the former can make it 
into consciousness, via a dedicated "special-purpose working memory 
system". This means that, in order to acquire knowledge of our own 
minds, which after all includes such items as goals, intentions, desires, 
and propositional attitudes such as belief of various sorts, we cannot 
count on any form of direct privileged access; instead, "we have to 
turn our mindreading capacities on ourselves, drawing inferences from 
sensorily accessible cues (including not only our own overt behavior 
and circumstances, but also such things as our own inner speech and 
visual imagery)"." Thus, to paraphrase one of Carruthers's examples, 
we may take the unconscious decision to leave for the bus, which 
subsequently causes us, in combination with other factors, to rehearse 
in inner speech the sentence "I'll leave for the bus now"; "This is 
globally broadcast and received as input by language-comprehension 
and mindreading systems, leading it to be heard as a decision to leave 
for the bus now." Yet, we should resist the idea that the original 
decision "has somehow become bound into the content of a sentence 
,; Carruthers, 2015, ix. 
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in inner speech" (thereby rendering the decision itself conscious in 
some way) since, Carruthers argues, the sentence embeds not the 
decision itself, but a "higher-order judgment to the effect that one is 
taking a decision".26 
Inner speech, then, is an especially effective way of broadcasting 
content to various subsystems, but it is not the exclusive basis of 
thought. Rather, it provides material for us to engage with in order to 
gain indirect and interpretive knowledge of our own minds, which is 
"no different in principle from our access to the thoughts of other 
people".27 If we are under the impression that we have privileged 
access to knowledge of our own minds, in a way that is different from 
how we gain knowledge of the thoughts of other people, then this is 
solely a reflection of the greater range and availability of contextual 
cues and background knowledge when bringing our mind reading 
capacities to bear on ourselves. Not only are "[mJany of the same 
contextual cues [ ... J available in the first-person as in the third", but, 
unlike in the case of interpreting another person, we can also ascertain 
through introspection what we are attending to. On this account, our 
mindreading capacities may themselves be thought of "as a consumer 
of global broadcasts", with the latter often (but not always) taking the 
form of inner speech; mind reading, then, is one of the beneficiaries of 
Carruthers's hypothesized "global broadcast architecture" of the 
mind. 28 
Integration via the broadcasting of content across mental modules, 
of course, is not limited to humans, but also occurs in non-linguistic 
(= non-human) animals, so it must be phylogenetically prior to the 
emergence of language. Indeed, for Carruthers, the non-linguistic 
mechanism for intermodular integration provides a blueprint for the 
(phylogenetically later) language-based mechanism, in spite of 
important differences." How, then, can some thinking be globally 
broadcast, in such a way that it registers at a conscious level and is 
26 Carruthers, 2015, 98. 
27 Carruthers, 2015, ix. 
26 Carruthers, 2011, 5l. 
29 I am here following the very concise summary of Carruthers's account found 
in Martinez-Manrique & Vicente, 2010, 155. 
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made accessible to other modules7 Roughly speaking, a course of 
action can be terminated just before being executed, but after quasi-
perceptual representations of it have been formed, which may then be 
sustained through the attention of executive systems or through the 
attenuated activity of motor systems." Such action-schemata may 
then be globally broadcast across the whole architecture of mental 
modules, serving as input for the conceptual modules. This allows for 
the 'real-time' representation of contemplated courses of action and 
for the evaluation of their consequences before a decision is taken. On 
this view, non-linguistic creatures, such as non-human animals, are 
able to (non-linguistically) evaluate different courses of action, but 
only by, in some sense, mimicking them and assessing, in a quasi-
perceptual way, the imminent consequences that would have occurred, 
had the action been seen through to completion. 
Humans, in virtue of language, have an additional pathway for 
broadcasting information across modules. Rather than quasi-
perceptually imagining (non-linguistic) actions and their consequences 
directly, in the way just described, we can also engage in imagined 
speaking; hence, the salient role of inner speech in the mental lives of 
human reasoners. In doing so, we send the requisite instructions to 
our language production module, yet abort the actual production of 
speech just in time (in much the same way as we would suppress the 
actual carrying out of the action in the non-linguistic case). As a 
result, speech is not uttered, but "quasi-produced", in the form of 
phonological images - that is, as inner speech, which, in turn, is 
received and decoded by the input linguistic module, and is then 
broadcast to those modules in charge of extracting further 
information. As Martinez-Manrique and Vicente put it: "Our conscious 
inner talk thus consists in this rehearsal of linguistic actions."" 
Carruthers's account of the mind as being marked by massive 
modularity, with the language module being accorded an important 
role in achieving cross-module integration, is ambitious and, it seems 
fair to say, somewhat speculative. Yet it has much going for it: for one, 
as discussed, it achieves some degree of theoretical unification 
" See also Carruthers, 2011, 49. 
n Martinez-Manrique & Vicente, 2010, 155. 
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between our accounts of animal minds and human minds - precisely 
(and perhaps ironically) by giving up on the unitary nature of the mind 
itself, conceiving of it as a vast collection of mental modules. And it is 
not all speculation: by committing himself to specific pathways of 
cognitive processing, Carruthers explicitly allows for, one might even 
say: invites, the empirical study of his account and its consequences. It 
is from this angle, however, that an empirical challenge has been 
mounted against the alleged central role of the language module in 
achieving seamless cross-module integration. The empirical 
phenomenon in question is known as verbal overshadowing, which 
occurs "when verbalizing mental contents deteriorates the 
performance of a task in which those contents appear to be 
involved".32 The effect was first described by Schooler and Engstler-
Schooler (1990) who, in a series of experiments with putative 
witnesses to a crime (simulated in the experiment by showing 
participants a short video clip of a bank robber), demonstrated that 
the act of providing a verbal description leads to a considerable 
deterioration of a witness's memory of the perpetrator, as shown by a 
decrease in the reliability of subsequently picking out the suspect's 
face from a photo line-up. It is not the case that the subjects in the 
experiment are merely distracted, as might happen if they were being 
fed extraneous linguistic information while being asked to 
simultaneously carry out - now less sucessfully, it turns out - a non-
linguistic task. Rather, in the case of verbal overshadowing the 
linguistic information is relevant to the task at hand and can even 
convey accurate information about the bank robber's appearance, 
which one might have expected to aid the identification process, but 
this is not what one finds in the experiment. At first sight, this might 
be considered prima facie evidence against the general view, of which 
Carruthers's account is an instance, that language serves as a lingua 
franca for a great number of mental operations. 33 Yet upon closer 
inspection, the theoretical repercussions of the phenomenon of verbal 
overshadowing are not quite as clear as this. For example, verbal 
overshadowing varies with levels of expertise (including familiarity 
32 Martinez-Manrique & Vicente, 2010, 157. 
33 This is how Martinez-Manrique & Vicente, 2010, interpret the matter. 
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with relevant vocabulary). Thus, in Melcher and Schooler's study 
(1996) of wine-tasting, experimental subjects with varying degrees of 
expertise ('novices', 'intermediates', and 'experts', respectively), after 
having had to give a verbal description of the flavour of a wine they 
had sampled, were asked to correctly re-identify it in a second round 
of tasting. Verbalization, it turned out, helped those considered 
'novices', had no effect on designated 'experts', yet led to 
deterioration in the performace of 'intermediates'. This, as Giovanna 
Colombetti has argued, suggests that it is not verbalization per se that 
is a problem, but poor verbalization, which reflects a mismatch 
between the (borderline-expert) sensory capacities of intermediates 
and their impoverished vocabulary, which does not allow them to track 
their sensory experiences in a sufficiently fine-grained way.34 
5. Inference, the 'inner interlocutor', and the perspectival 
character of thoug ht 
Though the empirical results indicate that not just any form of 
verbalization by the language module will give rise to cognitive 
integration (even if it involves relevant contents), all this shows is that 
the cognitive function of language is multifaceted. I shall return to this 
point below, where I will offer some thoughts on which factors may be 
relevant in such cases. For now, and in order to pave the way for the 
subsequent discussion, I shall turn to another aim of Carruthers's 
account: viz., to give an explanation of the flexibility of thought and of 
our ability to engage in abductive reasoning. 
Carruthers links the evolution of our ability to engage in abductive 
reasoning to the emergence of language. Ontogenetically, too, one 
finds that early childhood development is marked by the gradual 
emergence of a capacity "to generate, and to reason with, novel 
suppositions or imaginary scenarios"." In children this ability is 
perhaps most evident in pretend play, yet it carries over into 
adulthood in the form of creative thinking. How could such a capacity 
H 5ee Colombetti, 2009. 
~; All quotes in this paragraph are from Carruthers, 2003,511-512. 
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- "to suppose that something is the case (that the banana is a 
telephone; that the doll is alive), and then think and act within the 
scope of that supposition" - have arisen within a modular framework? 
As already noted by Vygotsky (see Section 2), much of the cognitive 
activity that accompanies childhood pretend playas well as creative 
supposition-generation in adults, takes the form of rehearsed inner 
speech, which, in Carruthers's interpretation, serves the function of 
globally broadcasting contents across a number of mental modules. 
When, as a result of this process, contents are inserted into novel 
cognitive contexts, this can associatively give rise to new contents. Of 
course, we do not merely generate new contents for the sake of 
novelty, but we often do so in order to solve problems and in contexts 
that require action, and for these ends we must also "come to believe 
some of our suppositions". 
Deciding on the best among a number of possible solutions to a 
problem, or choosing the best from a set of imagined courses of 
action, engages the very cognitive capacities that are commonly seen 
to be at work in abductive reasoning. Inferring the most likely 
outcome of a proposed course of action involves entertaining, and 
mentally rehearsing, a number of hypotheses about what will (or 
might) happen. Typically, such scenarios and hypotheses are 
rehearsed through inner speech (although, of course, we also have at 
our disposal the non-linguistic mechanism of quasi-perceptual 
simulation); when this is so, i.e. when "the hypotheses in question are 
expressed in language, the problem of inferring the best explanation 
reduces to the problem of deciding which of the candidate sentences 
to believe in the circumstances".36 Echoing the original Vygotskian 
insight into the social origins of inner speech, Carruthers notes "that 
the principles of testimony-acceptance are historically and 
developmentally prior to the principles of inference to the best 
explanation".37 When viewed from this angle, the problem of deciding 
between candidate sentences or hypotheses we find ourselves 
presented with is, of course, a familiar one: it is a version of the 
problem of which testimony to accept, and when. In both cases, we 
36 Carruthers, 2006, 364. 
37 Carruthers, 2003, 514. 
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find ourselves confronted with candidate sentences, whether 
presented to us by an external interlocutor or emerging as inner 
speech from internal thought processes. And just as we do not accept 
every claim or utterance by an interlocutor and form a testimony-
based belief on its basis, we do not accept every instance of inner 
speech as expressing a belief or as worthy of being relied upon in 
conscious deliberation - not least because we are aware of the varied 
functions of inner speech (see end of Section 3 above). 
This parallel between linguistic hypothesis-generation and the case 
of testimony points to a fruitful basis for readjusting our paradigmatic 
way for thinking about inner speech, by modelling inner speech after 
the way we receive testimony. Just like the testimony of others, so 
inner speech, on the overall account of cognition endorsed here, is 
best treated as the product of more complex processes - in this case, 
largely unconscious thought processes - which are not readily 
transparent to its recipient. This also applies to the phenomenology 
associated with the reception of such linguistic items; indeed, while 
there is bound to be a rich phenomenology in any particular instance 
of someone who, on that occasion, encounters either an external 
utterance or an instance of inner speech, it is by no means clear that 
there is such a thing as a unitary phenomenology of encountering 
linguistic items, let alone distinct phenomenologies of understanding 
inner speech and understanding testimony, respectively." As William 
Robinson notes, "[p]eople who understand what they are saying, or 
what is being said to them, are people who do not experience a 
problem with what is being said".39 When viewed from this angle, inner 
speech may be conceived of as the testimony of what one might call 
an inner interlocutor. Such a readjustment of our guiding conception 
of what inner speech is brings with it a new set of considerations that 
previously were not foregrounded. For example, real testimony is 
'" Perhaps because of this, few epistemologists of testimony nowadays argue 
that there is a distinct, identifiable phenomenology associated with testimonial 
acceptance or rejection. As Martin Kusch puts it, there "is no determinate 
phenomenology of testimony over and above imagined talk" (Kusch, 2002, 
25). See also Gelfert, 2014, 64-68. 
'" Robinson, 2011. 201; italics added. 
22 
Kairos. Revista de Filosofia & Ciencia 14, 2015 
Centro de Filosofia das Ciencias da Universidade de I isboa 
Axel Gelfert 
almost never context-free, but is accompanied by empirical 
circumstances, background knowledge, and other parameters (such as 
'conversational score'), all of which may inform the interpretation and 
contribute to, or detract from, the acceptability of the interlocutor's 
testimony. In testimonial encounters, we are not usually confronted 
with 'bare' messages, whose context and causal ancestry is inscrutable 
to us, but instead with empirically rich conversational situations 
emerging from, often enough (though not always), familiar contexts." 
All of this facilitates our assessment of individual instances of 
testimony, which would otherwise lack a justificatory basis. Yet, as we 
saw in our earlier discussion of Carruthers's position (see Section 4), 
the cognizer who encounters an episode of inner speech can likewise 
draw on a rich array of contextual cues and background knowledge for 
its interpretation - and indeed must do so if he is to gain knowledge 
about his own mind from such episodes. 
It may be promising, then, to model our engagement with inner 
speech as an encounter with the testimony of an 'inner interlocutor'. 
At first Sight, this might seem implausible: whereas in the case of 
testimonial knowledge there is a clear asymmetry between the speaker 
(who knows) and the recipient (who depends for his knowledge on the 
speaker), it might seem that in our case no such asymmetry exists. 
After all, what could my 'inner interlocutor' possibly tell me that I do 
not already know? This objection, however, is misguided, insofar as we 
are not dealing with two separate, fully formed epistemic subjects, but 
instead with relations between subpersonal mental modules. In this 
sense, the suggested parallel with the testimonial case may be 
considered partly metaphorical. But it is more than just metaphorical: 
what the parallel with testimony highlights is that there is more to 
inner speech than bare sentential (or subsentential) presentations of 
content. When we engage in inner speech, we adopt the perspective of 
'0 Contemporary epistemology of testimony tends to exaggerate the 
inscrutability of testimonial encounters, by unduly decontextualizing cases of 
testimonial knowledge, for example by focussing on one-off encounters 
between strangers; on this point see Olmos, 2008, and Gelfert, 2014, 85-90. 
An extreme case would be Tyler Burge, 1993, who discusses testimony in 
terms of bare (context-free) presentations of intelligible messages. 
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a recipient of testimony - even if the testifier is simply our 'inner 
interlocutor' - and in doing so, we draw on whatever else is available 
to us in coming to an overall assessment or conclusion. As in the case 
of a recipient of (external) testimony, such assessment is subject to 
competing desiderata and will deploy various heuristics as part of a 
satisficing strategy from the recipient's perspective." There will, of 
course, be differences between how we consciously evaluate inner 
speech and how we assess external testimony: for example, external 
testimony is subject to many social conventions, the violation of which 
may give us cause to reject the testimony (or at least request 
clarification). Furthermore, it has been argued that certain criteria and 
maxims that are appropriate for external testimony, such as 
relevance-theoretic considerations of informativeness and economy, 
cannot be brought to bear on the case of inner speech.42 To be sure, 
when it comes to inner speech, we cannot strictly distinguish between 
a speaker's intention to communicate and a hearer's recognition of 
such an intention, since we are dealing with aspects of one person's 
inner mental life. Yet, over time, most of us have learnt to distinguish, 
and alternate, between different (typically context-dependent) 
perspectives of our inner interlocutor. Indeed, the ability to adopt 
different perspectives in interpreting inner speech has been deemed 
by psychologists to be "one of the main differences between a healthy 
person's internal dialog and the pathology of hearing voices in mental 
illness".43 Conscious thought as encountered in inner speech, on this 
model, is ineliminably perspectival, and is marked further by a 
switching of perspectives in dialogue with our inner interlocutor - that 
is, in response to episodes of inner speech we experience as part of 
our conscious mental lives." 
"On this point, see Gelfert, 2010, 391-392. 
42 See Garcia Murga, 1998, 78. 
43 Puchalska-Wasyl, 2015, 444. 
44 Martfnez-Manrique and Vicente make a similar suggestion when they write 
that "precisely because the actual content of a thought takes into account 
perspective and context, while NL [natural-language] sentences do not, that 
having conscious thought does not amount to perceiving inner speech" (2010, 
151). 
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It is worth contrasting this proposal with the context-free, 
aperspectival picture that has so far dominated philosophical 
discussions of the phenomenon of inner speech and its role in 
cognition. Here, for example, is Clark extolling the virtues of "the 
coding system of public language" for the purposes of inner speech: 
"By 'freezing' our own thoughts in the memorable, context-
resistant and modality-transcending format of a sentence we 
thus create a special kind of mental object - an object which is 
apt for scrutiny from multiple different cognitive angles, which is 
not doomed to alter or change every time we are exposed to new 
inputs or information, and which fixes the ideas at a fairly high 
level of abstraction from the idiosyncratic details of their 
proximal origins in sensory input."45 
Such a mental object, Clark continues 46 , is "ideally suited" for the 
"close and repeated inspections" that may be subsumed "under the 
rubric of attending to our own thoughts" - not least since the quoted 
characteristics give stability and permanence to our mental operations, 
thereby allowing for "self-inspection and self-criticism". These are 
valid points, yet by asserting that conscious linguistic thought 
"minimizes contextuality", Clark all but seems to deny the perspectival 
character of thought. 47 This near denial puts pressure on the very 
possibility of successfully discharging the functions of inner speech 
that Clark identifies as supremely important. Take the example of 
self-criticism and its complex phenomenology, which, however vexed 
they may be in detail, involve not the elimination, but the switching of 
perspectives and contexts. Robinson, describing an experience of 
stage fright while presenting a conference paper, gives vivid 
expression to the phenomenology of switching between different 
perspectives: 
46 Clark, 2011, 34. 
" All snippets in this and the next sentence are from Clark, 2011, 34. 
" In the interest of fairness, it should be noted that Clark weakens his claim in 
a footnote, where he speaks of a " context-independence 
of public language" (italics added), thereby shifting the focus 
away from sentences towards their constituent signs and symbols. 
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"[Slomewhere in the middle of [reading my paper], I asked myself 
how I was doing. There followed a strange few moments in which, 
while continuing to read my paper, I wondered whether my 
asking myself how I was doing was affecting my delivery, judged 
that it was not, opined that it soon would if I didn't stop asking 
these questions, and admonished myself to get back to 
concentrating on the subject matter of my paper. During this 
(fortunately brief) period, I was also aware that while the words 
were continuing to come just as planned, I had no idea what I was 
saying."48 
As this example illustrates, inner speech often involves 
distinguishing between the speaker and the recipient49 ; the recipient of 
inner speech - who, on this occasion, is himself engaged in giving 
external testimony to others - finds himself confronted with 
pronouncements on his (external) performance, before switching back 
to a state of immersion in his external course of actions. In the case of 
stage fright, this may lead to an overall deterioration of performance 
on the external task, but when it comes to mental activities such as 
planning, analyzing, or self-criticism, adopting - and finding oneself 
confronted with - different perspectives in inner speech, is arguably 
part and parcel of their proper functioning. Bare, internal 
presentations of natural-language content alone can hardly constitute 
such activities; in order for them to acquire their specific functions, 
they require 'voice' - that is, we need to treat them as the criticism, 
advice, or suggestions we receive from an inner interlocutor. 
6. Conclusion 
Inner speech is a complex phenomenon and its philosophical study 
is richly rewarding, given that it raises numerous questions at the 
intersection of the philosophy of language, mind, and cognition. In 
this short paper, I have argued for a reconsideration of the standard 
view of the character of inner speech. While inner speech is often 
" Robinson, 2011, 200. 
'" On this point, see also Puchalska-Wasyl, 2015, 444. 
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